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Abstract The list of predicate crimes for the Recommendations of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) has evolved and grown over its twenty-five year existence.
The evolution of this list reflects shifting concerns among the central actors in the
organisation, as well as representing a response to any ‘displacement’ activity under-
taken by those seeking to avoid these forms of governance. When the scope for
cooperation and compliance with the FATF Forty Recommendations was extended
beyond the organisation’s membership this governance regime encountered business
sectors and financial practices not readily amenable to its objectives. This paper
considers the causes and consequences for the situation, as developing economy states
attempt to comply with the global governance expectations of the FATF when a
significant portion of the domestic economy operates ‘informally’. A frame of reference
is provided, with a definition for the informal economy and the concept of displacement
as used in research on criminal activity. The focus here is with the nature of the cash
economy operating beyond the scope of financial surveillance with implications for the
comprehensive effectiveness of the global financial governance regime. The context of
informal financial practice and its separation from the regulatory structures of the state
leads to a conclusion that global financial governance is limited in practice to the
domain of the formal economy.
Introduction
The scope of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has evolved and expanded from
its starting point, which focused on money generated by illegal drugs trafficking
deposited in banks, to include a variety of financial institutions and related businesses.
This evolution of scope and coverage represents one response to ‘displacement’, the
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rational practice by which illicit actors seek an alternative means of monetary
transfer/asset transformation when first banks and then other methods for monetary
transfer were subjected to government surveillance and control. The widening scope of
FATF governance brought the practitioners and officials representing the developed
states that comprised its initial membership roster into contact with financial practices
that, while operating at the margins of a developed economy, are widely used, if not
essential, in a developing economy environment. It was that centrality of these informal
economic practices in the developing economy which in turn produced unintended
consequences and encouraged resistance to FATF guidance in those developing econ-
omies [1]. Moreover, in an analysis on local circumstances with respect to the FATF
regulatory requirements, the costs of implementation and enforcement was felt to
exceed any potential direct benefit accruing to the developing economy ([2]; see also,
[3]). Such analysis further justifies resistance by developing states to the demands made
by global governance institutions, when the threat from money laundering and/or
terrorist finance in the local economy is deemed to be less than other sources of risk
(including epidemics and the consequences from climate change for low-laying
islands).
The challenge emerging from this set of circumstances involves the application
of processes and procedures designed for the regulatory structures of a formal
economy (frequently the dominant economic order found in a developed state) to
an informal economy (conversely more likely to dominate economic transactions
in a developing state). The dichotomy between the structure of an anti-money
laundering (AML) regime and its practical implementation beyond the developing
economy’s limited formal financial sector reduces its effectiveness to control
money laundering. Applying a process predicated on the implementation and
enforcement of rules for data collection, identity verification, data retention and
data reporting in an environment in which these processes achieve limited cover-
age is difficult. Though appearances can be deceiving, data may be collected and
retained and identities known and remembered even in the informal economic
environment when they are needed to conduct a successful and profitable business
[4]. It may simply be the case for these businesses that the informality of their
economic practices facilitates the avoidance of regulatory compliance (and the
associated cost of compliance) in other aspects (health and safety regulations,
labour laws, tax collection, etc.). Economic actors avoiding government regulation
for other reasons have little motivation to comply with regulations for money
laundering and terrorist finance, particularly if doing so would bring them to the
attention of other government agencies. Moreover, in an economy where the
percentage of the population that is ‘unbanked’ exceeds that percentage of the
population with a formal bank account all of the surveillance processes that rely
on the existence of a bank account and operate through the banking system have
limited impact. The result then is a situation where a range of economic activity is
effectively outside of the scope of mechanisms intended to stop money laundering.
The paper is developed across four sections with the next section outlining the
evolution of the FATF’s scope for its anti-money laundering regime. The follow-
ing section extends that discussion beyond the FATF and its member states
before moving to its attempt as a form of global financial governance to operate
in the informal economic setting. The efforts made to implement an anti-money
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laundering regime when a substantial component of the national economy is
cash-based rather than bank-based led to a further evolution of international
AML guidance. The final section of the paper considers the nature of the FATF’s
evolving engagement with informal economies before offering some concluding
thoughts.
An evolving scope for the domain of AML
The story for the origins of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is well-rehearsed
([5], p. 89–111; [6], p. 166–176; [7], p. 115–126; [8], p. 24–31; [9], p. 618–621). As
discussed in more detail in the introduction for this special issue, the FATF was initially
created to produce international standards to guide national efforts against the money
laundering activity associated with illegal drugs trafficking [10]. The initial focus for
the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
(1990) was drugs trafficking, emphasised in the first Recommendation for ‘each
country ... to fully implement the Vienna Convention’ ([11], p. 2). 1 The first eight
Recommendations concern the implementation of the obligations laid out in the Vienna
Convention, while Recommendations 12–29 are tasks to be performed by banks and
non-bank financial institutions (per Recommendation 9). The experience with
implementing the initial Forty Recommendations identified a number of areas requiring
further explanation and subsequently addressed with the production of Interpretative
Notes on individual Recommendations and a revision to the Forty Recommendations in
1996.
Subsequent to the introduction of Special Recommendations for terrorist fi-
nance in 2001 the core Forty Recommendations were revised once again. With the
2003 version of the Forty Recommendations the individual Recommendations
included more text to better explain the purpose and function of the Recommen-
dation (though more detailed Interpretive Notes remain part of the document). For
example, the revised Recommendation 8 encouraged financial institutions to
monitor new and emerging payment technologies for potential abuse by money
launderers while the new Recommendation 12 specified a range of ‘designated
non-financial businesses and professions’ which need to comply with the customer
due diligence and record-keeping obligations placed on financial firms. This list
comprised casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious metals and stones,
accountants, lawyers and other legal professionals, and trust and company service
providers ([12], p. 4–5). And the United Nations Convention on Transnational
Organized Crime (known as the Palermo Convention) is now identified alongside
the Vienna Convention in Recommendation 1 as a precedent source for the
criminalisation of money laundering ([12], p. 1).
In addition to the specifics identified in the Forty Recommendations document
and the accompanying nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, the
1 The Vienna Convention referred to here is the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988, a necessary pre-condition for the criminalization of money
laundering. Observe that the term ‘money launder’ is not present in this convention, rather it refers to the
confiscation of the proceeds derived from the criminal activities listed in the convention (see Article 5).
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FATF has sponsored a series of reports to study both the actual practice of money
laundering (at least as conducted by those who have been caught) and the potential
for other areas of economic exchange to be utilised for laundering the proceeds of
crime. These Methods & Trends or Typology reports cover a variety of economic
sectors, including some that may a first glace appear exceptional, such as the 2009
report on ‘Money Laundering through the Football Sector’ [13]. Other reports cover
further potential avenues for money laundering, such as hawala and alternative
remittance systems, corporate vehicles, trade and casinos [14–19]. Collectively, the
experience from implementing the Recommendations and then evaluating the
effectiveness of their implementation in combination with these studies led to a
reorganised and rewritten Forty Recommendations that fully incorporated the
standalone Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing in 2012 [20]. The
latest revision further expands the scope of the document with measures to include
the proceeds of corruption and tax crimes as predicate offences to money laundering
and measures to counter the financing of weapons of mass destruction. At the same
time this latest version reflects a recognition for the difficulties encountered by
some jurisdictions to effectively implement the AML regime crafted by the FATF. It
now incorporates a ‘risk-based approach’, which facilitates reduced surveillance
requirements for those identified as a low-risk for money laundering, such as the
poor and unbanked. The risk-based approach is explained further below.
The purpose behind this brief summary of changes in the evolution of the FATF’s
mission to identify money laundering practices is to highlight the FATF’s reaction(s) to
the attendant evolution of practices deployed to avoid its prescribed surveillance
mechanisms. The process of ‘displacement’ is a recognised concern in the criminology
literature and frequently noted in studies on the effectiveness of policing techniques and
practices. Displacement is defined as the movement of the criminal activity from one
location, time, target, crime, method or criminal to a different location, time, target,
crime, method or criminal ([21], p. 1333). It is an observed phenomenon in some
criminology studies, for example with respect to the deployment of CCTV systems to
reduce crime ([22], p. 510–513). While spatial displacement may be the most frequent-
ly seen form of the mechanism, displacement includes more than criminal activity
simply moving to a different location ([21], p. 1333). At the same time, the actual
measured presence of displacement is debated because if policing practices merely
result in displacement then crime itself is not reduced by the direct efforts of law
enforcement.
The term ‘displacement’ is not the only one used in the literature on the FATF
and money laundering to identify this phenomenon. One alternative term is the
‘balloon effect,’ an analogy used to indicate that pressure placed on one point of a
balloon pushes the air away to another point [23]. Similarly pressure placed on one
form of money laundering forces the practice to other forms of money laundering
([24], p. 862). For the case of money laundering the argument made to expand and
extend the coverage of anti-money laundering surveillance mechanisms to addi-
tional forms of economic exchange (e.g. real estate, on-line gaming or professional
football) as well as beyond the core member states of the FATF was an increasing
recognition of the displacement of money laundering practices to transactions and
locations not covered by existing anti-money laundering surveillance ([25], p. 5–8;
[8], p. 24; [26], p. 151).
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The world beyond the FATF
Beyond shifting to other means and techniques to conceal and transfer the proceeds of
crime, the FATF was confronted in 1999 with increased evidence that money launderers
were operating through institutions located in jurisdictions that were not members of
the organisation. A ‘typologies exercise’ held by the FATF in November 1995
discussed recent trends in money laundering and a specific agenda item was the flow
of illicit money from the ‘former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc’. One expert reported
at the meeting that US$40–50 million was believed to have entered that member state
from the region ([25], p. 3). The larger extent of this spatial displacement from the
former Soviet region was revealed, however, by an investigation of the Republic Bank
of New York, which in turn identified the Bank of New York to US law enforcement
authorities for failing to report suspicious transactions. It was far greater than suggested
at the 1995 typologies meeting with an estimated US$15 billion in suspicious Russian
capital passing through the Bank of New York onward to Pacific island financial
centres [27, 28]. These revelations caused a small furore in the New York City banking
community which responded by imposing private financial sanctions suspending all
US dollar transactions with all banks located in Nauru, Niue, Palau and Tuvalu ([29], p.
244–251). The FATF would subsequently formalise these private sanctions as public
sanctions through the production of its initial blacklist of ‘non-cooperative countries
and territories’ in 2000 with the provision that all members of the FATF were obligated
to enforce the financial sanctions [30, 31]. It became a highly controversial action,
particularly when the listed states pointed out the absence of other major financial
centres, to include the New York City banks that were the initial financial institutions
found to be complicit in suspicious Russian capital movements ([32], p. 93; [33]).
Indirectly the blacklist action served to impose the FATF’s Forty Recommendations
against money laundering on non-member states and jurisdictions. All cross-border
financial transactions with the identified jurisdictions were to be considered ‘potentially
criminal’ and subjected to close scrutiny. Once a jurisdiction was deemed by the FATF
to be compliant with its rules and expectations, it would be de-listed, the final
jurisdiction subjected to this blacklisting process was delisted in 2006 [34].2 As a result
of the more controversial aspects of the blacklisting process, the task of assessing and
measuring compliance with anti-money laundering and terrorist financing obligations
was assumed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under pressure from several
large developed states to include it and as a reaction to the 2001 terrorist attacks. The
assessments are conducted as part of the IMF’s Financial Sector Assessment Program,
significantly without the punitive features of the blacklist ([32], p. 94–98). However,
since that transition the FATF felt obligated in 2007 to reassert its public identification
of states failing in its assessment of their obligation to maintain adequate money
laundering and terrorist financing controls [35]. The initial state of concern was Iran
and the following spring the FATF expanded its list of deficient jurisdictions in order to
‘protect the international financial system from abuse’, and once again members states,
and in fact ‘all jurisdictions’, are urged to ‘advise their financial institutions to take the
2 The specific experience of the Philippines with the FATF blacklist and the Philippine government’s
subsequent regulatory self-discipline is presented in [1].
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risk arising from deficiencies in [the named jurisdiction’s] AML/CFT regime into
account for enhanced due diligence’ [36].
Additionally, in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks the FATF and other
international organisations found the need to give greater attention to migrant remit-
tance networks, otherwise known in the literature as informal value transfer systems.
Remittances themselves and the role they perform in the economy of many developing
states had been studied for a number of years, for example, the function of remittances
for the economies of small Pacific island states [37, 38]. And one early typology report
published by the FATF identified the use of ‘remittance services’ as a money laundering
technique found in Asia, while the typology report released the following year provided
more information on the operation of remittances services and hawala (the Arabic name
for one method) as an ‘underground banking’ system that was ‘almost always associ-
ated with ethnic groups from Africa and Asia’ ([25], p. 10; [39], p. 7). These informal/
formal methods for transferring money across borders and long distances represented
an unknown and in some aspects and locations an unregulated financial practice that
could be misused for money laundering in addition to the financing of terrorism.
The initial concern identified in 2001 that significantly increased the attention given to
remittance systems was a claim that the al Qaida terrorists used hawala to finance the
attacks in the United States (see, e.g., [40]). That accusation was disproved in the
Monograph on Terrorist Financing study prepared for the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States ([41], p. 139–140). The latter report does note
that al Qaida in fact did make extensive use of hawala in connection with its move to
Afghanistan in 1996 and thereafter while based in Afghanistan because the local banking
system was inadequate ([41], p. 25). A World Bank study on the operation and use of
hawala in Afghanistan opened with the assertion that the formal financial sector was
‘virtually non-operational’ in Afghanistan as a result of decades of conflict and
explaining hawala’s widespread use ([42], p. 1). The recognition that these informal
remittance transfer systems represented a potential avenue for terrorist finance andmoney
laundering outside of Asia or any identified ethnic community led to the production of
specific measures that required they be formalised and regulated in order to reproduce the
already existing surveillance mechanisms in place for the formal banking system and to
prevent their mis-use for money laundering or terrorist finance.3 The informal nature and
operation of remittance systems, as compared to the formal retail banking and financial
architecture more familiar to most contributors of the FATF’s Recommendations, guide-
lines and typologies underscored the need for improved engagement with informality and
informal economies more generally.
Informal economies and global financial governance
Absent from this narrative are the informal economic practices that operate alongside
the formal economy and extend beyond the practices employed for remittance transfers.
By their very nature, and by definition, informal economies and informal financial
transactions exist and operate beyond the scope of anti-money laundering practices. For
the purposes of this discussion, the informal economy is understood as the economic
3 The move to formalise the informal in the remittance transfer sector is explored in more depth in [43, 44].
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activity existing and operating outside the regulation and oversight of the government.
As such, it is the state through its laws and regulations that determine what is informal
by defining the activities that are determined to be legal and thereby demarcating the
boundaries of the formal economy [45]. Everything declared explicitly illegal or
implicitly not included inside the domain of state regulation exists in the ‘informal’
economy. This situation is particularly the case where there continues to be a demand
for the banned goods and services which are then supplied through the informal
economy.
Consequently the informal economy consists of a diverse collection of transactions,
ranging from the sidewalk vendor to the street market, and including flea markets, food
trucks, garage sales and unlicensed retail or manufacturing businesses, all of which
operate to a greater or lesser extent throughout the world. Essentially any cash-in-hand
or cash-only transaction for which tax is not collected nor paid is an informal economic
activity. In other words the informal economy is a cash-based economy.4 The term
‘informal economy’ carries a connotation of illegality, and any untaxed economic
activity by definition would be illegal. However, there is a distinction to be made
between the fruit and vegetable seller that does not collect and report sales tax and the
person selling heroin, even if operating in the same neighbourhood.
Informal economic practices are neither new nor unknown, while the practice will be
as old as taxation the term ‘informal economy’ is credited to the staff of the Institute of
Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, who introduced it to the authors of
the International Labour Organization report ‘Employment, incomes and equity: a
strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya’ in 1972 [47]. Accepting that
there is a flea market/jumble sale/garage sale every week somewhere, it also should be
recognised that the informal market’s economic contribution in the local community
does not begin to compare with the contribution of Wal-Mart and its local competitors
in town. Just how large or significant, then, is the informal economy? Naturally, this is a
difficult question to answer because along with being untaxed and unregulated the
economic activity of interest also is uncounted and not formally measured [48].
Attempts to measure clandestine economic activity, both of the licit variety as much
as with the illicit variety, is inherently problematic and deeply political [49]. Nonethe-
less, measuring the size of the informal, or ‘shadow’, economy has been central to
much of the research and publications of Friedrich Schneider, Professor of Economics
at Johannes Kepler University, Linz, Austria. In a study assessing the size of the
shadow economy over the period from 1999 to 2007 for a set of 162 states, the average
for the period ranged from 66.1% (Bolivia) to 8.5% (Switzerland) [50]. Importantly for
understanding the relative relationship between the prevalence of a sizeable informal
economic sector with the global governance initiatives against money laundering,
thirteen states were estimated to possess an economy with an informal sector compris-
ing greater than 50% of official GDP, 136 states were estimated to have an informal
sector forming between 15% and 50% of GDP, leaving thirteen states with an informal
economy estimated at less than 15% of GDP ([50], Table 2). In the view of some
observers the contrast between a formal economy and these informal or shadow
4 The term ‘cash-dominated’ economy was used by Humphrey PB Moshi as a point of distinction with the
informal economy. His point was that a cash-dominated economy operated equally well with both formal and
informal financial practices [46].
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economies represents The Dark Side of Globalization containing forms of Deviant
Globalization that are operating across Ungoverned Spaces [51–53].
Consequently the challenge for achieving effective enforcement of anti-money
laundering legislation in these economies is hampered by the size and influence of
the informal sector to serve as an alternative avenue for evading financial surveillance
mechanisms. Moreover there are factors beyond just the cash-based informal sector
which confront the developing economy when attempting to enforce its anti-money
laundering legislation. In a consideration of the situation present in the Andean states of
Bolivia, Columbia and Peru with money laundering and anti-money laundering en-
forcement activity Francisco E. Thoumi and Marcela Anzola identified three points of
failure. These three factors combined to produce an ‘inadequate environment’ for the
successful implementation of the anti-money laundering laws, providing an example
for what is known in the comparative legal studies literature as a Blegal transplant^
([54], p. 439). This concept means that while the national legislation followed the
guidelines and templates offered by the FATF the result was the implementation of
legislation that was ill-suited to the national political economy of these three states. In
part this result was the product of a situation in which the formal and informal sectors
of the national economy are heavily interconnected and intermixed such that the
legislation failed to adequately address the entire sphere of economic transactions that
are available for organised crime groups to launder their assets.
The first factor producing this inadequate environment is obviously the size of the
informal sector in these three Andean states and the authors agree that the figures
available are suspect, which they cite from an earlier study by Friedrich Schneider and
Robert Klinglkmair [55]. The figures from Schneider, et al. [50] estimated the ‘shadow
economy’ of Bolivia at 63.5% in 2007, Colombia at 33.5% and Peru at 53.7%. The
second factor identified by the authors has a clear connection to the first, which is the
small number of people with formal financial sector accounts in these states. Financial
exclusion has been identified elsewhere as an unintended consequence of the anti-
money laundering surveillance regime, specifically the formal identification require-
ments necessary to comply with the ‘know your customer’ obligation imposed on
financial institutions [56]. For these Andean states, however, the know your customer
requirement is not so much the barrier as is the condition of low ‘bancarization’ that
preceded even the introduction of anti-money laundering legislation and which reflects
a number of other barriers to financial inclusion that are present in these societies ([54],
p. 442–444). Obviously a condition of low financial participation, where few citizens
possess a formal bank account, creates a challenge when the central surveillance
mechanism of the anti-money laundering regime is to monitor customer activity at/
with financial institutions. When a significant part of the state’s financial activity occurs
outside of financial institutions it is effectively invisible to the anti-money laundering
surveillance regime. The final factor involves the issue of property rights, because the
historical trajectory of Latin America, as former Spanish colonies, created a very
skewed structure of land ownership leading to weak and ill-defined property rights
today.
The problem produced by weak property rights for local efforts to enforce the anti-
money laundering regime lays in the complication it creates for the use of asset seizure
as a disincentive as well as a punishment for criminality. Thoumi and Anzola relate the
difficulties experienced by governments to determine the ownership of assets seized
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from suspects and the subsequent need to maintain the operation of any seized
businesses until a court determines that the assets may be sold by the government. In
one example they relate that a boat seized by law enforcement for carrying cocaine, was
subsequently rented out by the government administrator while waiting for the owner-
ship question to be resolved and that the boat was seized a second time for once again
transporting cocaine ([54], p. 452). This problem with seized criminal assets is not
unique to Latin America; the Financial Times reported in 2012 of a move by business
schools in Italy to provide a postgraduate course for ‘would-be managers of ex-Mafia
concerns.’ The article outlined the experience of the manager for a hotel and conference
centre seized in Sicily, noting that it was normal for the judicial system to spend years
to determine ownership of the seized property and then approve its sale by the
government, which could take several more years while a buyer for the property was
sought [57].5
The alternative outlets for economic transactions to launder money or facilitate
terrorist finance when the formal financial system is barred by surveillance systems
are ‘new’ in the sense of emerging to satisfy this demand to transform or transfer assets.
Yet at the same time such practices have been present in society even before named the
‘informal economy’ in 1972. They may not be as convenient as a bank, nonetheless
these informal methods offer the means to avoid the mechanisms of financial surveil-
lance. As a form of migrant remittance transfer hawala is a long standing financial
system that has operated in the absence of a modern banking system for centuries [59].
The practice of trade mis-invoicing also has a long history of use to get around
government regulations, whether on tariffs, customs duties, capital controls or banned
goods ([60], p. 33–48). Trade-based money laundering has received increased attention
for the ability of trade to move economic value across borders with the appearance of
legality. And the sums involved may be quite substantial, US law enforcement officials
found US$65 million during a raid in the Los Angeles Fashion District while investi-
gating the use of clothing companies for trade-based money laundering between the US
and Mexico [61]. The latter example represents yet another instance of the ‘black
market peso exchange’ already familiar to the FATF as a form of trade-based money
laundering ([62], p. 5).
Yet at the same there is an important connection to the informal economy which is
not about money laundering (as such) but rather about the movement of goods that are
smuggled or undervalued at point of delivery in order to avoid/evade import duties and
customs tariffs. These trade practices serve to connect formal economy regulation with
the informal economy named by some authors as ‘low-end’ globalisation or globalisa-
tion ‘from below’ [63–65]. The strategy is relatively simple for the cases described by
these authors, in order to circumvent (evade) these duties and tariffs the trader includes
a visit to a print shop listed on the business trip’s itinerary to Hong Kong or Guang-
zhou. The print shop will produce a made-to-order purchase invoice reflecting the
goods and the desired purchase price that will move the shipment through customs at
the destination with the least amount of cost or problems. These practices to evade
duties and tariffs on small-scale transnational trade blend in with practices of trade-
based money laundering to skew trade data. When that trade data is analysed at the
5 This aspect for dealing with criminal assets was further investigated by the UNODC Open-ended Intergov-
ernmental Working Group on Asset Recovery in 2014 [58]
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aggregate level the discrepancy is identified as money laundering regardless for other
purposes, potentially on a massive scale [66, 67]. Yet it would be incorrect to identify
the fraudulent behaviour involved in tariff evasion with the use of trade transactions to
legitimise ill-gotten gains from other business activity, such as the transport and sale of
illegal drugs [68].
Engaging informality
In recent years the FATF has responded to the problems raised by developing
states as they struggled to implement the Forty Recommendations in their formal
financial sectors. As noted above, the concern for increasing financial inclusion
appears to be in confrontation with the surveillance mechanisms desired by the
FATF. The resolution to this problem that emerged from the FATF was the
introduction of risk assessment and the establishment of a ‘risk-based approach’
to address the problem with countering terrorist financing and money laundering.
Over several publications this risk-based approach was developed, starting with
high-level principles and procedures and then outlining how they could be imple-
mented in a specific financial sector, including for example remittance transfer
businesses [69–71]. This approach proposes the use of practices and procedures
that are scaled to the perceived level of risk among the expected customer base,
the type and size of transaction and the involvement of other (potentially suspi-
cious) locations or destinations. Implementations of the risk-based approach have
been analysed and criticised, however, for failing to be sufficiently adapted to the
circumstances seen in operation with informal economic activity.
For the case of remittance systems, a study using Afghanistan and the United Arab
Emirates as examples for the application of FATF regulatory requirements found that
the risk-based approach had not been implemented as desired. The governments for
these two states had implemented compliant enforcement measures for the formal
financial sector and then applied those same measures to the informal financial sector.
The result identified by the authors was an ineffective regulatory environment in which
the surveillance practices used by a formal sector financial firm, for example the ‘know
your customer’ requirement to record all identification details, were inappropriate to the
‘working modalities’ of the remittance transfer sector. These mechanisms were also
resisted by remittance operators not simply because they were foreign and externally
imposed, but also because they ‘ignored important cultural, social and religious factors’
([72], p. 417). The increasing use of mobile phone technology for financial services,
including remittance transfers, have brought that technology within the scope of anti-
money laundering regulation and the application of a risk-based solution to surveillance
requirements [1].
More broadly, the FATF Recommendations address cash at the point of entry to the
financial system (cash bank deposits for example) and when it crosses the border in
sums greater than 15,000 dollars or Euros [73]. Yet enforcement of the Forty Recom-
mendations where large sums of cash are involved is not always comprehensive, for
example, with real estate where reports on large cash property purchases are not made.
The real estate sector has attracted attention for these large cash purchases, from the
media in the UK and US leading to enhanced regulations in the US [74–76]. The
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concern with the role performed by cash is long standing. A guidance manual produced
by the Commonwealth Secretariat a decade ago included recommendations on
restricting the use of cash in a national economy ([77], p. 59). The advice has not
changed substantially since that publication, restrict cash transactions above a certain
amount, promote the use of the formal banking system, and eliminate high value
denomination bills.
There are several difficulties revealed by the evolution of the FATF as an
institution of global governance and its engagement with informal economies. First,
the process of displacement leads the outside observer to compare the evolving and
growing range of measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist finance as an
adult variation to the children’s game of Whack-A-Mole. Each newly identified
typology of money laundering brought yet another form of economic exchange
under the purview of the FATF (via revisions to the Forty Recommendations),
leading money launderers to pursue further alternative means to legitimise ill-
gotten gains. Second, the difficulties experienced when applying methods and
techniques developed to monitor formal economic sector transactions to informal
economic activities revealed the existence of prerequisites for successful imple-
mentation. It is not simply the fact that small informal remittance transfer busi-
nesses do not want to pay the cost for collecting and retaining customer data, it is
also the fact that customers did not possess the formal identification documents
necessary to facilitate compliance. Thus, the successful implementation of global
governance mechanisms crafted by the FATF is dependent on other forms of local
governance, to produce and certify identity documents, to maintain registries of
citizens containing the identity data and to provide the means to verify identity on
demand. In essence, while the formalisation of these informal sector economic
actors is often proposed as the solution to the existence of an informal economy,
the mechanisms to accomplish formalisation require institutional capacity which at
present may be beyond the means and ability of the state in question. Moreover, the
state may have other objectives behind the classification and documentation of its
citizens and residents [78].
Which is not to say that technological solutions are not available, simply that they
require resources and institutional capacity to implement and maintain. India is in
the midst of a massive project to collect biometric data on all citizens. This ‘unique
identity’ project will provide an online-accessible identity database which should
reduce if not eliminate a range of current fraudulent and corrupt practices that
deprive citizens without identity documentation of the government benefits they
are due [79]. It is already being applied in India’s banking sector as part of the
industry’s AML practices and explicitly to advance financial inclusion initiatives
[80]. Similarly, Mexico has implemented an electronic invoicing system to collect
business invoices as the mechanism to reduce tax fraud. This system has the
additional consequence of shutting down the false invoice printing businesses that
had facilitated an estimated loss of US$3.4 billion in tax revenue between 2007 and
2009 in Mexico [81]. Nonetheless, the prerequisite for implementing global finan-
cial governance incorporating informal financial practices presumes a transition to
formal practices. In order to achieve such a transition it is first necessary to construct
its supporting infrastructure, of identity documents and the related forms of infor-
mation necessary to know these customers.
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Concluding thoughts
On reflection, the evolution of the FATF’s scope for anti-money laundering and its
intersection with informal economic practices suggest the problem may be found in
the structural approach undertaken by the organisation. The FATF prepares its
Recommendations as general guidelines in order to fit diverse legal systems,
yet also explicitly specifies the conduct of money laundering and the methods and
techniques performed to achieve laundered money. The result is that having identi-
fied the head of a money laundering mole peeking out of the ground and whacking it,
the targeted mole recovers and relocates to a different position using a different
method requiring yet another whack on the head to suppress it. In structuring a
regulatory regime, it is a choice between establishing principles for guidance, or
crafting rules for implementation. Similar to regulating finance, this choice deter-
mines the capacity for responding to dynamic change and the emergence of new
methods and techniques [82]. The application of anti-money laundering controls in
an informal economy was a response to the displacement of money laundering
activity from the formal economy. But a rules-based approach lacks the flexibility
necessary for dealing with the nature of an informal economy. The implementation
of the anti-money laundering surveillance mechanisms has been problematic and
unevenly distributed. One response was to introduce a risk-based approach with an
expectation for the rules-based methods to be scaled as appropriate for the locally-
identified level of risk. Actual practice may not match that expectation. At the same
time, money laundering displacement in the formal sector is seen to have advanced
yet further, with the identification of potential money laundering activity in the sale/
purchase of fine art and French vineyards ([83, 84], p. 27).
In a development further demonstrating the linkage between formal banking insti-
tutions and remittance transfer firms, many (if not most) formal retail banks have closed
the accounts held by remittance firms [85, 86]. The increased use of fines to punish
banks for failing to maintain adequate anti-money laundering controls has prompted a
rational actor response on the part of the banks, to identify and remove risky clients
from their customer base [87]. In turn this rational response is likely to promote
increased informality as the remittance firms are forced to find other avenues to transfer
their customers’ funds and that move is likely to place their operations outside the view
of existing anti-money laundering surveillance [88]. The banks’ process to reduce their
risk is essentially ‘forced displacement’ though it has been named ‘de-risking’ and it
creates a new problem for the FATF mission to secure the global financial system
against illicit money [89]. The underlying tension is centred on the question – what is
the objective? The answer for the FATF has been, and remains, to address criminality
and terrorism by depriving it of financial resources and capabilities. The tension arises
where the means for achieving the objective conflicts with other objectives for a
government and society. If displacement is a rational response of the criminal or
terrorist and it is reflected in their practices to find other methods of transferring cash
or economic value, then the objective for the FATF has been achieved. The rigorous
enforcement of anti-money laundering obligations on the formal sector appears to be
forcing the informal, and potentially illegal, financial transactions, however, beyond the
scope of financial surveillance altogether and as a result serving to circumvent the
original objective for those obligations.
Vlcek W.
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